Friday, October 10, 2014

State Rubbish Collectors v. Siliznoff case brief summary


State Rubbish Collectors v. Siliznoff case brief summary

F: D collected trash from the one company, which regarded as within the territory of another member of Abramoff. The D was called and ordered to pay over the collected money to Abramoff. An inspector of the Association told D that D get
down to the board meeting and make agreements about the Acme Brewery. Otherwise, they would physically beat him up, burn the trucks, or put him out of business. Finally, D agreed to join the association and pay for the Acme account. He promised to return the next day and sign the necessary papers. Because of the fright he suffered during this period, he became sick and had to remain away from work for several days.
-> no cause of action for assault, because there is no imminent apprehension.
I: Whether P causing D emotional distress is liable for that emotional distress as well as the physical injury resulted from it. R: P causing D emotional distress is liable for that emotional distress as well as the physical injury resulted from it.
C:
Affirmed

Whittaker v. Sandford case brief summary


Whittaker v. Sandford case brief summary

F: D offered passage back to American on his yacht. While D’s told him of her afraidness of being locked in yacht, D
assured her that under no circumstances would hse be detained on board. On arrival in port, D refused to furnish her with
a boat so that she could leave the yacht. She remained on board for nearly a month.
I: Whether D’s refuse to provide the P with boat and making her remained on board is physical restraint in order to
establish a false imprisonment
Real reason of being confined is her and all of her important belongings (her children and her belongings)
R: When P consents to an initial confinement. If so, there will nonetheless be FI if the D is under a duty to release the P, or to help him escape, and does not do so.
Remittitur – reduce the damage or order new trial (choice)
C: affirmed
Co: Confinement does not have to be horirible.

Enright v. Groves case brief summary


Enright v. Groves case brief summary

F: Groves observed a dog running loose in violation of city’s dog leash ordinance. Upon recognizing the P was in the vehicle parked at the curb by the house, Groves went to Enright. Groves demanded her driver’s license. She simply gave him her name and address, not a driver’s license. Not conforming to Grove’s request of showing a driver’s license, Groves grabbed her arms, and took her to the police station where charging her with violation of the dog leash ordinance.
I: Whether police’s arresting D due to not conforming to his demanding of D’s driver’s license without explaining the reason for it, but in fact the violation of dog leash ordinance, constitutes a proper legal authority for arresting D?
R: False arrest arises when one is taken into custody by a person who claims but does not have proper legal authority
C:
affirmed

Hardy v. LaBelle’s Distributing case brief summary


Hardy v. LaBelle’s Distributing case brief summary

F: P was working at the D’s store, and was assigned duty as a sales clerk in the jewelry department. The other employee thought that P steal one of the watches in D’s store, and reported to the manager. Later, manager approached to Hardy and told all new employees were given a tour of the store. He showed her into the manager’s office and left, closing the door behind him.
I: Whether D’s detaining P was unlawfully restrained against P’s will under the false imprisonment
[But, tricked. Was confined by physical confinement. Doesn’t have to be confined physically. Abuse of legal authority is confinement. (very very protective of people in this case)
Where there is no actual confinement but taking someone’s important belongings (very frequently become jury’s question)]
R: No FI when no threat of force was used to compel the person to stay against his/her will.
A:
P admitted that she wanted to stay and clarify the situation. She was not told she could not leave. No threat of force
or otherwise was made to compel her to stay. Also, even under pretence of a tour, she would have followed him
voluntarily if she had known the true purpose of the meeting and that two policemen were in the room.
C: affirmed

Parvi v. City of Kingston case brief summary


Parvi v. City of Kingston case brief summary

F: Cause of action : false imprisonment
Police found two brothers engaged in a noisy quarrel in an alley behind a commercial building, and all three were showing
the effects of alcohol. Police had no place to go, so rather than arrest him, they took him outside the city limits to an abandoned golf course to dry out.
I: Whether P being in the state of drunkenness was conscious of his confinement at the time when Police took him when establishing false imprisonment.
[Can a plaintiff where there is no immediate recollection, nevertheless proves the the conscious of confinement? YES. Because, there is no requriement of present recollection.
The place of confinement: police car against his will. To get damages being hit by the car. Prove relationship, between
false imprisonment and being hit by car.
If Golf course is the place of confinement, it is easy to prove the damage hitting by the car. (golf course is surrounded by dangerous highways) rather than claiming that the place of confinement is police car. Not only being psychologically being locked in the confinement but also the physical injury being hit by the car.]
R: P being in the state of drunkenness was conscious of his confinement at the time when Police took him when establishing false imprisonment. Or D is not liable for FI when P was not aware of the confinement at the time it occurs.

Big Town Nursing Home v. Newman case brief summary


Big Town Nursing Home v. Newman case brief summary

F: P was taken to D by his nephew who signed the admission papers, which states that patient will not be forced to
remain in the nursing home against his will for any length of time, but P was not advised he would be kept at the nursing home against his will. D placed with insane persons, alcoholics knowing he was not in such category; punished P by locking and taping him in the restraint chair; prevented him from using the telephone; lock up his clothes; told him he could not be released until he began to obey the rules; and detained him for certain period.
 
I: Whether D’s treatment without P’s prior consent can be deemed as a establishing the false imprisonment.
 

[No indication of intent, no evidence anyone know that he should be confined. Corporation had a knowledge that the man should not be improsoned, nevertheless they prisoned him. In order for corporation to have intent, some one employee One employee (pressing button) + one employee( toxic) à difficult to combine as a corporation to have an intent for torts.]

R: D is liable for FI when D has prevented P from leaving a certain limited area w/o legal justification.
 

C: Affirmed

Western Union Telegraph v. Hill case brief summary


Western Union Telegraph v. Hill
F: P request D to fix her clock. Upon hearing nothing from D, P directly went to D. D, who had 2 or 3 drinks, tried to put his hand to P with a request that she come behind the counter in D’s office, and that, if she would come and allow D to love and pet her, he would fix her clock.
[Apprehension (different from fear)]
I: Whether D had an enough space to reach P to touch her as to the apparent present ability in establishing of an assault [Did P have awareness of present ability to effectuate ?]
R: The actual ability of D to cause harmful or offensive touching is not a requirement for assault.
[Physical contact is impossible. Doesn’t matter literally impossible, but to be apparently impossible. Appearance to the plaintiff.(subjective but must be reasonable) Not the question of actually possible.

C: Reversed on the ground that D had not acted within the scope of his employment

Co: While every battery includes an assault, an assault does not necessarily require a battery to complete it. What it does take to constitute an assault is an unlawful attempt to commit a battery, incomplete by reason of some intervening
cause; or to constitute an actionable assault there must be an intentional, unlawful, offer to touch the person of another in a rude or angry manner under such circumstances as to create in the mind of the party alleging the assault a well funded fear of an imminent battery, coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented. [Apprehension according to the court it must be reasonable : well founded fear

an awareness of you can make it happen a contact....]

I de S et ux. v. W de S case brief summary


I de S et ux. v. W de S

F: W, with force and arms, did make an assault on M and beat her. W came at night to the house of I and sought to buy wine, but door was shut and he beat upon the door with a hatchet, and M put her head out of the window and told him to stop, and he saw and struck with the hatchet but did not hit M.
I: Whether W tried to hit M, but in vain, can be considered ...........element in establishing assault
R: P may recover damages for assault though no physical injuries are shown

Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel case brief summary


(4) Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel
F: While the P was in a meeting in D’s hotel, he was approached by one of D’s employees, who snatched the plate from his hand, and shouted that a racial discriminating word. P was not physically injured, but he was embarrassed
I: Whether D’s snatching the plate from P in an offensive manner, without occurring any physical injury, but an embarrassment, is eligible for offensive contact in constituting a battery.
Whether P’s mental suffering arising out of D’s offensive contact, in the absence of any physical injury, can be a personal indignity as a result of an action in battery.
R: D’s snatching the plate from P in an offensive manner, without occurring any physical injury, but an embarrassment, is eligible for offensive contact in constituting a battery
P’s mental suffering arising out of D’s offensive contact, in the absence of any physical injury, can be a personal indignity as a result of an action in battery
C: reversed
Co: The intentional snatching of an object from one’s hand is as clearly an offensive invasion of his person as would be an actual contact with the body.

Wallace. V. Rosen case brief


Wallace. V. Rosen case brief

F: The high school had a fire drill while classes were in session. Wallace was
at the high school at that time. When the fire alarm sounded, Rosen escorted her class to the stairway, and noticed some people are blocking the student’s exit including Wallace, and Rosen told everybody to move. Wallace wasn’t able to hear Rosen over the noise of the alarm and Rosen had to touch her on the back to get her attention.
Mental state = intent à not always. (to find the nature of the contact)
If misstates the
􏰞, if insubstantial fact
Rosen placed her fingertips on Wallace’s shoulder and turned her 90 degrees toward the exit in the midst of a fire drill. (rude, insolent manner)
I: Person’s contact, which is touching someone’s back among the crowds during the fire drill (in a unusual circumstances of emergency situation) when escorting the class as a teacher, is considered to be done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner under the battery?
R: Person’s personal contact, which is touching someone’s back among the crowds during the fire drill when escorting the class as a teacher, is not considered to be done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner under the battery. (or knowing or intentional touching of one person by another in a rude, insolent, or angry manner constitutes a battery)
A:
Individuals standing in the middle of a stairway during the fire drill could expect that a certain amount of personal contact would be inevitable. Rosen had a responsibility to her students to keep them moving in an orderly fashion down the stairs and out the door. Under these circumstances, Rosen’s touching of Wallace’s shoulder or back with her fingertips to get her attention over the noise of the alarm cannot be said to be a rude, insolent, or angry touching.
C: Affirmed

State v. Donaldson


State v. Donaldson case brief summary

F:Donaldson entered a van owned by the other person, who did not give Donaldson a permission to take possession or control of the van. Upon checking the van by the police, he recognized the steering column had been dismantled; there were wires hanging from the column; the ignition switch had been removed; wires protruded from the ignition. The brake lights flashed. The radio worked. The check engine sign was lit . Donaldson was convicted of second-degree theft.
Donaldson filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion. Donaldson appealed. I:Whether the defendant possessed or controlled the van under the Iowa code
R:Donaldson controlled the van within the meaning of Iowa Code
A:We find Donaldson took possession or control of another’s property with the intent to steal.

C:Affirmed

Not found in guilty (taking) in California.
Iowa followed MPC (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NJ, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Penn, Tex, Wash, Wiscon, Mich, Oklahoma, and West Vir.) 


B. Notes and Questions
a. legislative intent
b. plain meaning
c. role of legislative history
d. other statutory interpretation tools
- Ejusdem Generis: this rule limits the general language to the specific terms. - statutory title

- expression unius est exclusion alterius: The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. This is used by D when a statute contains a list of acts or circumstances and they argue that
by enumerating specific items the legislature intended to exclude anything that falls outside the list.

e. rule of lenity: criminal statutes should be interpreted narrowly in order to ensure that a D is not convicted for a crime about which the person may have been unaware.
f. international law

The Basics of a Criminal Prosecution


(1) The investigation
(2) The charge
(3) Pretrial motions
(4) Trial: The constitution entitled a D to a jury trial if he can be incarcerated on a charge for more than 6mth for the offense. D can waive a jury trial if the prosecution agrees, in which case the judge hears the case as the trier of fact. For most minor offenses, the court will decide the case.

(5) Plea bargain: The gov. and D can agree to a plea bargain under which a D will plead guilty to certain charges, often in exchange for a lower sentence. The agreement requires the D to waive the right to trial and proceed immediately to sentencing. The gov. may demand as a condition of the plea bargain that the D cooperate in its investigation by identifying other wrongdoers against whom the D will testify if the gov. initiates other prosecutions. Sentencing may be postponed until the D fulfills the bargain to testify against others.
(6) The jury instruction: the statement of the law given to the jury at the end of the trial
(7) Motion for a judgment of acquittal: similar to a summary judgment in a civil case, but only a D can seek to have the case dismissed for insufficient evidence.
(8) Double Jeopardy: A D may not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, so that if a person is found “not guilty” of a charge, then the government may not pursue that charge in a second proceeding, regardless of the strength of its evidence. Exception is the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, which permits a different state or the federal government to prosecute a person for the same crime so long as the state or federal government has jurisdiction over the offense.
(9) The basis for an appeal
(JECE)
a. insufficient evidence
b. improper
jury instruction
c.
evidentiary challenges
d.
constitutional challenge

2. Statutory basis of criminal law
(1) Criminal Statutes
(2) The model penal code: promulgation of the MPC in 1962. Drafted by the ALI, the MPC has been widely influential in the states in drafting their own penal statutes. Many states have adopted portions of the MPC, and courts frequently refer to its approach as a basis for interpreting
criminal statutes that are not drawn specifically from that source.
(3) interpreting statutory language
(4) studying criminal statutes